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Two events have collided to give prosecutors enormous power. The ﬁrst is an inveterate retreat from robust enforcement of police
conduct under the Fourth Amendment. The second is a now-dominant use of negotiated pleas to resolve criminal cases. The
combination has meant a signiﬁcant increase in the already substantial power of prosecutors—power that is being deployed in a way
that disadvantages black and brown defendants. Put somewhat more directly, a straight line can be drawn from the expanded power
of the police over black and brown bodies in the streets to the expanded power of prosecutors over black and brown lives in the
courtroom.

As this article explores, while the Fourth Amendment is commonly criticized for the discretion it aﬀords police oﬃcers, an overlooked
result of the amendment’s lax regulation of the police is the enhanced power it aﬀords prosecutors. Though for a time a warrant was
the notional measure of reasonableness, over the last century the Court has crafted several exceptions to that measure to give the
police greater leeway during on-the-street encounters. The Court has concurrently retreated from robust application of the
exclusionary rule to remedy constitutional violations. These shifts have meant far more predictable wins for the prosecution at the
suppression hearing stage. And suppression hearing wins matter.
Though jury trials are popularly touted as indispensable, in reality the American criminal justice system is a system of negotiated
pleas. A ﬁnding of guilt is arrived at through concession and compromise, not adversarial wrangling for truth. In this system, the
predictability of suppression hearing wins strengthens the prosecution’s already strong hand. And while studies suggest that people
of color may be somewhat less likely to plead, when they do they receive a worse deal (on average) than their similarly situated white
counterparts. Much ink has been devoted to the Fourth Amendment’s failure to police the police. The amendment is failing too,
though, at policing the prosecution.

Downgrading the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Requirement
The text of the Fourth Amendment announces a right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. For many years,
reasonableness was equated with a warrant. If the police got one, their conduct was, for the most part, lawful. If they didn’t, they ran
the risk of acting unconstitutionally. However, the warrant “requirement” has been substantially downgraded by the judicial creation
of numerous exceptions that grant the police wide latitude to forcibly search and seize without ﬁrst obtaining pre-authorization. In
all, the Court has named six such exceptions.

https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/publications/criminal-justice-magazine/2018/fall/policing-prosecutor/

1/6

4/23/2021

Policing the Prosecutor: Race, the Fourth Amendment, and the Prosecution of Criminal Cases

Search Incident to a Lawful Arrest, Plain View, Automobile, Consent, Exigency, and Special Needs are all areas in which exceptions to
the warrant requirement have been carved out by the Court. In each of these areas, police oﬃcers armed with adequate antecedent
knowledge or the proper set of precursor facts can engage members of the public without ﬁrst justifying the encounter to a neutral
and detached magistrate. Perhaps more signiﬁcant than the sheer number of exceptions created is the expansive authority granted
by each.
For example, under Plain View, a law enforcement oﬃcer can observe and seize an item without implicating the Fourth Amendment
if (1) the observation is made from a lawful vantage point, (2) the oﬃcer has lawful access to the item, and (3) the contraband nature
of the item is immediately apparent to the oﬃcer. (See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983).) Moreover, the exception does not apply
just to visual observation. It includes a police oﬃcer’s sense of touch, Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993), and (in some
jurisdictions) the oﬃcer’s sense of smell, see, e.g., United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738 (10th Cir. 2006).
The police enjoy similarly broad latitude under the Exigency exception. Under this exception, if the police have an objectively
reasonable basis for believing immediate action must be taken to avoid injury to people or evidence, oﬃcers can lawfully engage in
warrantless conduct for the purpose of addressing the emergency. While the exception does require some sense of urgency, it does
not require headlong breathless ﬂight or a general “hue and cry” in the streets. Indeed, the Court long ago held that a suspect’s simple
decision to step back into her home upon seeing the police was suﬃciently “exigent” to trigger application of the exception. (United
States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976).) Even police-manufactured exigencies (like banging loudly on the door of a home, causing the
people inside to panic) can trigger the exception so long as the oﬃcers’ exigency-creating conduct is lawful. (Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S.
452 (2011).) Plain View and Exigency are not unique in their breadth. The other named exceptions oﬀer the police similar freedom.
Moreover, in addition to the six named exceptions, the Court has created another vast carve-out to the warrant requirement.
Speciﬁcally, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court found that police, without a warrant, can engage in a forced (albeit limited)
warrantless seizure whenever they reasonably suspect the person they are stopping is involved in criminal activity. The police also,
pursuant to Terry, may engage in a forced (albeit limited) warrantless search, whenever they reasonably believe the person they have
stopped is armed and presently dangerous. Since its creation, the Terry doctrine has been expanded in ways that increase the
categories of cases to which it applies and reduce the quality of evidence needed to trigger its application. Although the Court has
never deviated in theory from its declaration that a police oﬃcer’s “inarticulate hunches” will not suﬃce, the Court has been
somewhat less demanding in practice. Indeed, the Court has described reasonable suspicion—the level of suspicion required for a
Terry stop—as a “ﬂuid concept.” (Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996).) The relatively indeterminate nature of the
assessment has meant that even innocent behavior at times has been used to justify police engagement. In Illinois v. Wardlow, for
example, the Court found that William Wardlow’s decision to run after seeing the police satisﬁed the reasonable suspicion standard
because Wardlow was in a “high crime” area. (528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000); but see Massachusetts v. Warren, 58 N.E.3d 333 (Mass. 2016).)
Likewise, the Court has expansive notions of what oﬃcers may do during Terry encounters. For example, under Terry’s authority,
oﬃcers may order any driver or passenger out of the car during a routine traﬃc stop, even in the absence of particular suspicion. (See
generally Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997).) Similarly, the Terry authority to frisk a person for weapons has been expanded to
include the area immediately around the person stopped, including (for traﬃc stops) the interior of his or her car. (Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032 (1983).) As I (and others) have written elsewhere, this generous understanding of what Terry allows makes it the one
case perhaps most responsible for the drastic (and dangerous) increase in warrantless police-citizen interactions. (See, e.g., Renée
McDonald Hutchins, Racial Proﬁling: The Law, the Policy, and the Practice, in POLICING THE BLACK MAN (Angela J. Davis ed., 2017); Devon
Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: The Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CAL. L. REV. 125
(2017).)
Without question, the Court’s above-described expansion of police power has met with some criticism. Writing in dissent to a case in
the Terry line, the late Justice Marshall summed up his concerns as follows: “Today’s decision invokes the specter of a society in
which innocent citizens may be stopped, searched, and arrested at the whim of police oﬃcers who have only the slightest suspicion
of improper conduct.” (Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 162 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).) Voicing comparable discontent after the
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Court granted oﬃcers the automatic authority to order drivers out of their cars during routine traﬃc stops, Justice Stevens wrote,
“[T]o eliminate any requirement that an oﬃcer be able to explain the reasons for his actions signals an abandonment of eﬀective
judicial supervision of this kind of seizure and leaves police discretion utterly without limits.” (Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,
122 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).) The Justice also cautioned that the newly sanctioned discretion might be exercised in
discriminatory ways: “Some citizens will be subjected to this minor indignity while others—perhaps those with more expensive cars,
or diﬀerent bumper stickers, or diﬀerent-colored skin—may escape it entirely.” (Id.) Evidence of judicial concern also can be seen in
the Court’s 2009 (Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009)) and 2014 (Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014)) decisions limiting somewhat
the authority granted under the “search incident” exception. However, in the main, the trend has been toward aﬀording police oﬃcers
more, not less, authority under the Fourth Amendment.
Moreover, this loosening of Fourth Amendment constraints has had undeniable racial impacts. Indeed, in a very real sense, the Court
has erected an oﬃcial wall of Fourth Amendment indiﬀerence to racialized policing. From Korematsu to Terry to Whren, the Court
has consistently and repeatedly permitted a role for race in police decision making. As Devon Carbado has written, “there is a direct
relationship between the scope of ordinary police authority, on the one hand, and African American vulnerability to extraordinary
police violence, on the other.” (Carbado, From Stopping Black People, supra, at 128.) The same can be said of prosecutorial authority
over black lives: A direct line can be drawn between the above understanding of police authority under the Fourth Amendment and
the expanded ability of the prosecutor to secure convictions that disparately impact black Americans. But, before turning to consider
the power of the prosecutor, one ﬁnal link in the Fourth Amendment chain needs to be explored—the (non)exclusion of
unconstitutionally obtained evidence.

A Retreat from Exclusion
As you just read, the Court has watered down Fourth Amendment protections on the front end by downgrading the warrant
requirement to something more akin to a warrant presumption. At the same time, the Court has watered down Fourth Amendment
protections on the back end by sharply tailoring the availability of its chief remedy. Though other remedies exist, the exclusionary
rule long has been the primary method for redressing violations of the Fourth Amendment. (Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).) The
Court’s current understanding of the exclusionary rule, however, makes it far less available.
When the exclusionary rule was ﬁrst adopted, the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence was understood to be required
by two distinct, but equally robust, rationales. First, notions of judicial integrity made it inappropriate for courts to rely on evidence
that had been obtained through violation of the Constitution. As the Court explained in its now-overruled decision Weeks v. United
States, the “tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and
enforced confessions . . . should ﬁnd no sanction in the judgments of the courts, which are charged at all times with the support of the
Constitution.” (232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).) The second rationale for excluding evidence was that exclusion was thought to deter future
police misconduct. The thinking was if the police could not proﬁt (in the sense of admissible evidence) from their bad behavior,
oﬃcers would be less inclined to break the law in the ﬁrst instance. (United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).)
However, the Court has retreated entirely from “judicial integrity” as a rationale for exclusion. Currently, the deterrence of future
misconduct is seen as the only justiﬁcation for excluding evidence. (Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011).) This shift to deterrence
only has meant that far less gets excluded. While judicial integrity is a broad rationale that keeps virtually all unconstitutionally
obtained evidence from the fact-ﬁnder, deterrence is a much narrower rule. In cases where police conduct cannot be characterized
as entirely purposefully, it may be diﬃcult to conclude that exclusion will deter future violations. Consequently, Fourth Amendment
violations occasioned by police ignorance, inattention, and even sheer incompetence all have been found not to require exclusion.
The Court also has created several exceptions where evidence will not be excluded despite deliberate police misconduct.
Independent source (Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988)), inevitable discovery (Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984)), and
attenuation of the taint (Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975)), all are recognized instances in which exclusion is not required even
though a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred. Exclusion is similarly not required if the illegally obtained evidence is being
used only to impeach the accused. (United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980).) Finally, exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is not
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required if the prosecution can demonstrate that police oﬃcers acted in “good faith” and did not willfully violate the Constitution.
(United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).) In practice, these various restrictions have meant that unconstitutionally obtained
evidence is frequently deemed admissible.
But what does any of this—downgrading of the warrant requirement or limitations on exclusion—have to do with the prosecution?
As noted at the outset, criticism of the Court’s permissive interpretation of the Fourth Amendment focuses primarily on how much
discretion it aﬀords the police. But, as will be discussed below, a straight line can be drawn from the discussion above to an increase
in prosecutorial power.

prosecutorial power and plea-based “justice”
As Angela J. Davis has explained, prosecutors are the most powerful players in the criminal justice arena. (ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY
JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 5 (2007).) Prosecutors enjoy enormous discretion in deciding who to prosecute and
how harshly. The criminal law does not obligate a prosecutor to do anything. Instead, it creates an array of choices from which the
prosecutor may select. (William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2549 58
(2004).) The metastasizing of criminal oﬀenses oﬀers a smorgasbord of options. There are so many criminal oﬀenses on the books in
most places that a prosecutor often can easily charge two or three oﬀenses for conduct that most lay people would consider a single
crime. (See generally Máximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial Adjudication in American
Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 229 (2006).) The plea-based model of criminal justice that dominates the American system
enhances this power.
Though high-proﬁle jury trials capture national attention and drive public perception of what happens in “most” cases, the reality is
quite a bit diﬀerent. In 2017, 97.2 percent of criminal cases were resolved by plea. That total was down from 97.3 percent of cases
resolved by plea in the preceding year. (See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2017 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, ﬁg. C.)
Bargaining can occur with regard to the charge, the sentence, or both. In a plea-based system, the prosecutor and defense attorney
become the primary adjudicators of guilt. But the fact that the defense is a participant in the negotiation does not mean the
bargaining power of the two sides is equal.
For a variety of reasons, prosecutors have the upper hand in plea negotiations. First, the decision of whether to negotiate at all is one
vested entirely to the discretion of the prosecutor. If the prosecutor oﬀers nothing, the defense has no right to force a concession. In
the absence of a deal, the defendant’s only options are to go to trial or plead to the indictment. Upon conviction, assuming the
absence of mandatory minimums, the defendant is left to the mercy of the sentencing judge. This option is of limited appeal in cases
where a long list of charges may result in considerable sentencing exposure.
For prosecutors inclined to negotiate, the initial array of charges they choose to ﬁle will establish the “opening oﬀer” around which all
negotiating occurs. And, in many cases, there is no scarcity of charging options. Increasing the number of charges brought provides
prosecutors with chips to bargain away during the negotiating process. “Overcharging,” both vertically and horizontally, is a practice
proscribed by the American Bar Association’s Standards for Criminal Justice precisely because of the improper pressure it exerts.
(AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, sec. 3 3.9(b)(f).) However, the breadth of the criminal law makes it nearly impossible
to determine when a prosecutor is aggressively (but properly) papering a case and when a prosecutor is increasing the degree or
number of charges for the sole purpose of increasing negotiating leverage. And though more empirical studies are needed, those
writing in the ﬁeld have found that prosecutors routinely charge oﬀenses with little chance of success at trial or for relatively minor
criminal conduct, all for the purpose of “sweetening” an inevitable plea oﬀer. (See, e.g., William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001).)
Hand-in-hand with the prosecutor’s discretion over charge selection is the reality that a prosecutor chooses which oﬀenses to charge
with full knowledge of the potential sentence each charge might carry following conviction at trial. At least one study of the federal
system found that sentences following trial are 60 percent higher than sentences following a guilty plea. (Langer, Rethinking Plea
Bargaining, supra, at 229.) This substantial sentencing discount can be a powerful incentive for the accused to plead. Indeed, even in
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a case with relatively weak evidence of guilt, a prosecutor can oﬀer a suﬃciently steep sentencing discount to make pleading appear
to be the only rational choice. In fact, in a perverse result, one study found that prosecutors exert the most pressure to plead, using
tactics like steeply discounted sentences, in cases with the least likelihood of conviction at trial. (Albert Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s
Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 58 64 (1968); see also Dean Champion, Private Counsels and Public Defenders: A Look at
Weak Cases, Prior Records, and Leniency in Plea Bargaining, 17 J. CRIM. JUST. 253, 257 (1989).)
The prosecutor’s charge selection can be particularly relevant to sentencing concerns in jurisdictions with so-called three-strikes
laws. These laws impose harsh mandatory minimum sentences on third-time oﬀenders even for relatively trivial convictions. In such
jurisdictions, the prosecutor’s willingness to charge an oﬀense as (or accept a plea to) a misdemeanor instead of a felony allows the
accused to avoid the severity of three-strikes sanctions. Even in non-three-strikes districts, the applicability of lengthy mandatory
minimums, based on factors like threshold drug quantities or the presence of a weapon, can exert pressure to plead. In these cases,
prosecutors can bargain away the counts requiring mandatories, meaning an accused who pleads will retain the possibility of
shortening any sentence imposed through diminution credits and/or parole. The signiﬁcant power of the prosecutor just described is
further ampliﬁed by the Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. This is because, not surprisingly, the prosecutor’s power to
negotiate is informed by the available evidence.

The Fourth Amendment’s Role in Enhancing Prosecutorial Power
Unquestionably, the strength of the government’s evidence increases the prosecutor’s ability to extract a plea from the defendant
with fewer concessions. Predictably, studies have shown that, along with the number of charges ﬁled, the availability of physical
evidence increases the probability that an accused will plead guilty. (Celesta Albonetti, Race and the Probability of Pleading Guilty, 6 J.
QUAN. CRIMINOLOGY 315, 317 (1990).) But, as examined in the section above, the Fourth Amendment presents a less-than-robust barrier
to the prosecutor’s access to even illegally obtained evidence.
Suppression motions are ﬁled in a minority of cases. (Jon Gould & Stephen Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police Behavior
Under the U.S. Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 315, 332 n.13 (2004) (summarizing studies to estimate that only 15 percent of all
cases involve the ﬁling of suppression motions).) And, even when ﬁled, the odds of suppression based upon a successful Fourth
Amendment challenge are relatively low. (See generally ANDREW FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE, RACE, AND THE
FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 152 (2017).) The prosecutor’s already strong hand in plea negotiations, thus, is strengthened further by the
likely failure of any suppression request. This strengthening can be particularly striking in cases involving possessory crimes. For
example, in a straightforward possession with intent to distribute case where drugs are taken oﬀ the accused during a Terry stop,
suppression of the drugs may be determinative. However, in light of the numerous exceptions to the warrant requirement, even
aggressive or unsavory police conduct often falls well within constitutional limits. And even where police conduct violates the
amendment, unconstitutionally derived evidence nonetheless may be admissible as a result of the Court’s constriction of the
exclusion remedy.
Indeed, decades of studies show an abysmal success rate for suppression motions. A 1979 study done by the General Accounting
Oﬃce found that “16% of the defendants whose cases were accepted for prosecution ﬁled some type of suppression motion, 11% cited
the fourth amendment. However, only 0.4% of declined defendants’ cases were declined due to fourth amendment search or seizure
problems.” (GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, IMPACT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON FEDERAL
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 1 (1979).) The prospect of a successful suppression motion has not improved much in the intervening years.
A 1983 study of 7,500 felony cases in Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Michigan determined that motions to suppress physical evidence
were successful in less than 1 percent of the cases ﬁled. (Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical
Assessment, 3 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 585 (1983).) Indeed, a 1991 survey of defense attorneys in one jurisdiction asserted that judges in the
area “‘always upheld searches regardless of what errors or lack of probable cause were found.’ As a result, members of the defense
bar rarely made search and seizure an issue.” (Craig Uchida & Timothy Bynum, Search Warrants, Motions to Suppress and Lost Cases:
The Eﬀects of the Exclusionary Rule in Seven Jurisdictions, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1034, 1059 60 (1990 1991).) When motions were
ﬁled, they accomplished the goal of suppression in just 0.9 percent of all the cases studied. (Id. at 1061.) Putting aside the question of
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/publications/criminal-justice-magazine/2018/fall/policing-prosecutor/

5/6

4/23/2021

Policing the Prosecutor: Race, the Fourth Amendment, and the Prosecution of Criminal Cases

defense counsel’s ineﬀectiveness for failing to ﬁle motions, the prosecution, unfettered by any signiﬁcant fear of suppression,
maintains the advantage in plea negotiations. An accused facing the potential of signiﬁcant prison time and dismal odds of
suppression may ﬁnd a negotiated plea the only logical choice.
Finally, in much the same way that racial disparities exist across the criminal justice system, the enhanced pressure to plead has racial
impacts as well. While studies have found that blacks are somewhat statistically less likely to plead guilty, when they do, they receive a
lower-value bargain for their plea than comparable white oﬀenders. For example, whites are 25 percent more likely than blacks to
have their top charge dropped or reduced during the negotiation process. (Carlos Verdejó, Criminalizing Race: Racial Disparities in
Plea Bargaining, 59 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 3 4).) Similarly, for defendants facing felony charges, whites are 15
percent more likely than blacks to be able to resolve their cases with a misdemeanor conviction. And, in the misdemeanor space,
whites are 75 percent more likely either to avoid conviction altogether or to secure a conviction that does not carry a risk of jail time.
(Id. at 33.) The increased likelihood that blacks will be convicted or face jail time is a compounding disability: A criminal record and
history of incarceration are factors that will be considered negatively during any future contacts with the criminal justice system. As
Sasha Natapoﬀ has observed, oftentimes “the misdemeanor process is the gateway to the criminal system.” (Sasha Natapoﬀ,
Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1055, 1068 (2015).) It is in this way that a straight line can be drawn from the
expanded power of the police over black and brown bodies to the expanded power of prosecutors over black and brown lives.

Conclusion
Great attention is paid to the Fourth Amendment’s failure to meaningfully police the police. But the amendment (as currently
interpreted by the Court) also is failing to police the prosecution. In a criminal justice system dominated by pleas, the refusal to
suppress evidence is a factor that exponentially enhances the prosecutor’s relative standing. Where that prosecutorial power is
already being exercised in ways that disadvantage people of color, the further increase in power is an outcome we cannot continue
to overlook.
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